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Abstract
Comparative household micro income databases do not report the level of social transfers
after taxation. Consequently, disaggregated redistributive analyses of the welfare state are
based on gross income components. In most countries, however, social insurance benefits
are subject to taxation. In such instances, the level and equalising effect of social insurance
to income inequality are overestimated, both in absolute terms and in relation to non-
taxable benefits. One way to avoid this problem is to estimate the level of net social insur-
ance by the use of a so-called proportional tax estimation technique. This technique, how-
ever, causes a misspecification of the level of net social insurance in cases where taxation is
established at the individual level. In this paper we therefore apply the proportional tax es-
timation technique for validity analyses on household income data. The question is to what
extent this estimation of taxes misspecifies the level of net social insurance. It is found that
the proportional tax estimation is viable when separating social and fiscal policies in com-
parative analyses on household micro income data. The underestimation of the level of net
social insurance which is due to the application of the proportional tax estimation tech-
nique is negligible compared with the overestimation occurring from not taking taxes into
account.
Keywords: Welfare state, Social policy, social insurance, income taxation, inequality, redis-
tribution, comparative.2
Previous research highlights the importance of measuring social insurance net of taxes, in
order to make the value of social entitlements (Korpi, 1989; Palme, 1990; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Mitchell, 1991) and social policy effort comparable across countries
(Adema, 2001). Nevertheless, it is common in comparative redistributive analyses of spe-
cific social transfer schemes to disregard taxation of social insurance (e.g. Deleeck, 1992;
Jäntti, 1997; Aaberge et al., 2000; Hataaja, 1999; Pedersen, 2000). Consequently, the redis-
tributive effects of social insurance are overestimated. In some cases this misspecification
have important implications for both inter- and intra-country comparisons of the impact of
social insurance on income inequalities (Ferrarini and Nelson, 2002).
Taxation of social insurance entitlements has become a more frequent feature in the ad-
vanced welfare states during the last decades. With the exception of the Netherlands and
Switzerland, only pension benefits were subject to taxation before the 1960s. In the fol-
lowing two decades most of the OECD-countries introduced taxes on an increasing num-
ber of social insurance entitlements. However, some countries still have elements of non-
taxable benefits in their social insurance systems. With the exception of pension income,
no special allowances or tax credits exist for social insurance benefits. Thus, social insur-
ance benefits are generally taxed in the same way as work income.
Comparative household micro income databases, such as the Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS), do unfortunately not report the post-tax level of different income components.
Taxes paid on different parts of the household’s income package must therefore be esti-
mated. One method is to ascribe taxable social insurance benefits a share of total income
taxes paid corresponding to their relative size in the gross household income package
(Rainwater, 1993). This proportional tax estimation technique does, however, misspecify
the value of net social insurance when taxes are paid on individual incomes. The purpose3
of this paper is to evaluate whether a proportional estimation of taxes poses any serious
problems of validity in analyses of household income data. The question is to what extent
this estimation misspecifies the level of net social insurance packages.
We will here conduct two validity tests. The first validity analysis is based on micro income
data from the Swedish Level of Living Survey (LLS). With this data it is possible to com-
pare estimates of the level of net social insurance when the proportional tax estimation
technique is applied on household and individual income packages, respectively. The sec-
ond validity analysis is based on a fictitious income distribution, which makes it possible to
assess the generalisability of the results from the Swedish case to countries with other in-
come tax systems. The countries included in this analysis are Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The Proportional Tax Estimation Technique
The proportional tax estimation technique of net social insurance is shown below. Assume
that an income distribution comprises only married couples and let each spouse, (i) and (j),
receive an amount of taxable social insurance benefits (S). Let (T) denote the amount of in-
come tax paid on total taxable income (M). If income data are available at the individual
level, estimated net social insurance benefits of the household (h) are calculated in three
steps, as shown in Eq. (1) to (1.3), below. The first two steps involve a separate calculation
of net social insurance for each spouse. The third step is simply constituted of a summation
of net social insurance of the two spouses.
Estimated Net S = Si – ( Si / Mi ) * Ti (1)4
Estimated Net Sj = Sj – ( Sj / Mj ) * Tj (1.2)
Estimated Net Sh from individual income packages
= Estimated Net Si + Estimated Net Sj (1.3)
If income data are only available at the household level, it is not possible to apply the three
steps shown in the above formulas. Instead, the proportional tax estimation technique as-
cribes social insurance a proportional share of the total income taxes paid corresponding to
its relative size in the gross taxable income package of the household, as shown in Eq. (2),
below. The right side of the equation shows the proportional weighting procedure of the
total taxes paid by the household. The difference between the estimated level of net social
insurance when the proportional tax estimation technique is applied on household and in-
dividual income packages, respectively, is the error of net social insurance due to the use of
household income data, as shown in Eq. (3).
Estimated Net Sh from household income packages =  Sh  – ( Sh  / Mh ) * Th  (2)
Estimation Error Sh = Estimated Net Sh from household income packages -
Estimated Net Sh from individual income packages  (3)
Evidence from Swedish Household and Individual Level Income Data
In cases where the proportional tax estimation technique is applied on household income
whereas tax liability is established at the individual level, it is expected that the estimation
error of net social insurance on average is negative, since the spouse with the largest share
of social insurance in the individual income package is likely to have a lower taxable income5
than the other spouse. Due to the progressivity of income taxes, the proportional tax esti-
mation technique will in such cases overestimate the tax claw-back of transfer income and
thereby underestimate the level of net social insurance. Market income is overestimated by
the corresponding amount.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 shows the relative estimation error of net social insurance benefits in ten income
groups delineated on basis of equivalised gross taxable income in Sweden.1 Only couples
are chosen as base line for comparison, since an estimation of taxes paid on different in-
come components is necessary only for these households. The results are in line with the
expectation that a proportional estimation of taxes overestimates taxation of social insur-
ance when household income packages are used. However, the relative estimation errors
are small. On average net social insurance is underestimated by 1 per cent, which should be
evaluated in relation to an overestimation by approximately 30 per cent if taxes are not de-
ducted.
Assessing Generalisability of the Results
The analysis in the above section shows that the estimation error of net social insurance is
almost negligible compared with the misspecification occurring from not taking taxation
into account in the Swedish case. However, the size of the estimation error depends on the
redistributive mechanisms of the income tax system. The proportional tax estimation may
therefore pose validity problems in countries with separate taxation of spouses and where
the income tax system is more progressive and tax rates are higher than in Sweden.26
As is evident from Figure 2, however, none of the tax systems in the other countries satisfy
both these conditions.3 It is clearly shown that countries tend to rely either on high tax
rates or on high tax progressivity. Belgium and Sweden are the only countries that score
above average on both these aspects, but far from having the highest values.
[Figure 2 about here]
To evaluate whether the proportional tax estimation technique pose validity problems in
countries with different tax systems, we will here simulate the effects of direct income taxes
and social security contributions in Belgium, Denmark and Sweden as expressed in tax leg-
islation of 1995 on a modified version of the fictitious income distribution applied in Fig-
ure 1, above.4 Belgium and Denmark are chosen for comparison with the Swedish case
since Belgium has the greatest tax progressivity and Denmark the highest average tax level
of the nine countries under investigation.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 shows the results of this exercise. Negative simulated relative estimation errors in-
dicate an underestimation of the level of net social insurance. The positive estimation error
for Sweden in the first income group is due to the basic tax allowance, which is regressive
in lower income brackets. Most importantly, however, simulations of the Danish and Bel-
gian income tax systems do not reveal any larger deviations from the Swedish pattern.5
Discussion7
The purpose of this article was to apply the proportional tax estimation technique for va-
lidity analysis on household micro income data. The question was to what extent this esti-
mation misspecifies the level of net social insurance. Although the proportional tax estima-
tion overestimates the amount of taxes paid on social insurance and, consequently, under-
estimates the value of net social insurance, the results suggest that this estimation does not
introduce serious problems of validity in analyses of household income data. The underes-
timation of the net level of social insurance when estimating taxes from household income
data is much less of a problem than the overestimation resulting from not taking taxes into
account. This seems to be the case regardless of the degree of tax progressivity and average
tax level of income tax systems in modern welfare states.
The possibility to decompose tax/transfer systems into program specific components im-
proves the ability to formulate and test hypotheses about which institutional differences in
countries social policy systems that produce divergent distributive outcomes. The demand
for such analyses has increased with the world wide economic recession in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. In the last two decades of the 2000th century most Western countries have
implemented cuts in social security provisions and experienced an increase in income ine-
qualities. However, cross-country differences remain substantial. This may indicate that
some welfare states still achieve a greater redistribution of economic resources than others.
In order to learn more about why some welfare states are more successful in combating in-
come inequalities, more specified analyses of the distributive process are needed. Since we
in this paper have approved one method for calculating net income components from
household income data, one of the obstacles for conducting such analysis is removed.
 Notes8
1 We here use the “old” OECD equivalence scale, which gives the first adult a weight of 1,
subsequent adults a weight of .7 and each child a weight of .5.
2 Another factor that may cause biased estimates is cross-national differences in the intra-
household distribution of different income sources. Since labour force participation and
market income are more equally distributed in some countries than in others, cross-
national differences in the intra-household distribution of different income sources could
cause validity problems of estimated net social insurance. However, a factor working in
the other direction is that that the lower paid female spouse in countries with compara-
tively unequal distributions of market income more often is confined to untaxed means-
tested benefits, while working males are more likely to receive taxable social transfers
(Sainsbury, 1996).
3 An income tax system is defined as progressive (regressive) if the richer (poorer) individu-
als pay more (less) tax in proportion to their incomes; and it is defined as proportional if
the tax liability is equally distributed among the individuals in relation to their incomes.
Progressivity is measured as the excess of the concentration index of taxes over the Gini
index of the pre-tax income (Kakwani, 1976). The average tax rate is simply defined as
the average tax liability of included households. For each country we have simulated di-
rect income taxes and social security contributions as expressed in tax legislation in 1995
on a fictitious income distribution. The fictitious income distribution comprises a single
and a one-earner family with two children earning 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, up to 3.0 times of an aver-
age production worker’s wage. The value of an average production worker’s wage is de-
rived from the Social Citizenship Indicators Program (SCIP) at the Swedish Institute for
Social Research at Stockholm University. For documentation of the SCIP database see
Korpi (1989).9
4 The fictitious income distribution in this exercise comprises only two-earner households
with none, one, two and three children where one of the spouses receives work income
and the other spouse receives taxable social insurance for the whole tax year. Work in-
come is defined as 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, up to 3.0 times of an average production worker’s wage
and social insurance as 60 per cent of these amounts.
5 The simulated estimation errors are larger than in reality due to the assumptions used in
the fictitious income distribution (compare Figure 2).
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Figure 1 Relative Estimation Error* of Net Social Insurance and Taxation of Social Insurance in 























Figure 2 Institutional Characteristics of Income Taxes in Ten OECD-countries in 1995. 





















Source: National tax legislation (tax year 1995).13
Figure 3  Relative Simulated Estimation Errors of Net Social Insurance in ten Income 













Source: National tax legislation (tax year 1995).